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Behavioral/Systems/Cognitive

Purging of Memories from Conscious Awareness Tracked in
the Human Brain
Benjamin J. Levy1 and Michael C. Anderson2
1

Department of Psychology, University of San Francisco, San Francisco, CA 94117-1080 and 2MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge CB2 7EF,
United Kingdom

Understanding the neural basis of conscious experience and its regulation are fundamental goals of science. While recent research has
made substantial progress in identifying the neural correlates of conscious experiences, it remains unclear how individuals exert control
over the contents of awareness. In particular, can a memory that has entered the aware state be purged from consciousness if it is not
currently desired? Here we tracked the correlates of consciousness in humans using functional magnetic resonance imaging and demonstrated the involvement of a downregulation mechanism that purges contents from conscious awareness. When individuals tried to
prevent the retrieval of a memory in response to reminders, hippocampal activity was reduced, as previously established. Crucially, using
trial-by-trial reports of phenomenal awareness, we found that this reduction of hippocampal activation was specifically associated with
moments when a memory involuntarily intruded into conscious awareness and needed to be purged. This downregulation of activity
during memory intrusions appears to disrupt momentary awareness of unwanted contents and, importantly, predicts impaired recall of
the memory on later tests. These results tie the voluntary control of phenomenal awareness to observable changes in neural activity linked
to awareness, and so provide a neurobiological model for guiding inquiry into the physical foundations of control over consciousness.

Introduction
Neurobiological research on consciousness has revealed neural
activity that tracks the entrance of perceptions and memories into
awareness (Crick and Koch, 1995; Kreiman et al., 2002; Rees et al.,
2002). For example, both single unit electrophysiology (Kreiman
et al., 2000; Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2008) and functional neuroimaging (Eldridge et al., 2000; Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Montaldi
and Mayes, 2010) have identified neural activity in the human
hippocampus that tracks the presence of memories in conscious
awareness, indicating that activity in this structure contributes to
memories achieving the aware state (Clark and Squire, 1998). It is
less clear, however, how control over the contents of awareness is
achieved. Here we monitored neural markers of awareness to
examine whether people could make contents leave consciousness voluntarily, and, if so, how this purging is accomplished in
the brain. We hypothesized that the controlled suppression of
neural activity supporting awareness may be a key mechanism
supporting the purging of unwanted contents.
To test this hypothesis, we focused on the hippocampus to
determine whether neural activity contributing to mnemonic
awareness can be suppressed when people purge its contents. We
Received June 1, 2012; revised Aug. 13, 2012; accepted Sept. 4, 2012.
Author contributions: B.J.L. and M.C.A. designed research; B.J.L. performed research; B.J.L. and M.C.A. analyzed
data; B.J.L. and M.C.A. wrote the paper.
This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant 0643321, National Institute of Mental Health
Postdoctoral Fellowship F32-079648, and a grant from the UK Medical Research Council (MC-A060-5PR00). We
thank Valerie Carr for guidance on anatomically defining the medial temporal lobe regions and Arpeet Shah for
drawing these masks.
Correspondence should be addressed to Benjamin J. Levy, University of San Francisco, Department of Psychology,
2130 Fulton Street, San Francisco, CA 94117-1080. E-mail: bjlevy3@usfca.edu.
DOI:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2640-12.2012
Copyright © 2012 the authors 0270-6474/12/3216785-10$15.00/0

examined how people control mnemonic awareness using the
Think/No-Think (TNT) paradigm developed to study retrieval
stopping (Anderson and Green, 2001). Prior work with this paradigm demonstrates that attempting to stop retrieval in response
to a cue makes it harder to recall the associated memory on later
tests (Anderson and Green, 2001; Anderson and Huddleston,
2012), a finding hypothesized to reflect the weakening of suppressed traces through inhibitory control (Anderson and Green,
2001). We propose that this inhibitory control process, triggered
by the detection of unwanted traces in awareness, suppresses hippocampal activity, providing a physical basis by which people
purge an experience from consciousness.
To examine the purging of content from phenomenal awareness, we isolated moments when a memory entered a person’s
awareness and this awareness needed to be suppressed, and further linked these perceptions of memory to functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) measures of hippocampal activation.
For this purpose we used the trial-by-trial introspection method
developed in research on attention (Sergent and Dehaene, 2004;
Sergent et al., 2005; Corallo et al., 2008). This method uses reports
of private, first-person experience collected immediately after a
cognitive operation to analyze behavioral and neuroimaging data
according to phenomenological state. Following this method,
our participants classified their experience after each trial in the
TNT task according to whether the presented cue led its associated memory to enter consciousness (Fig. 1A). We made four predictions. First, memories often would intrude into awareness
involuntarily, but attempts to stop retrieval would decrease intrusion frequency. Second, how quickly intrusions declined would predict later memory suppression, reflecting a relationship between the
processes that exclude a memory from consciousness and forgetting.
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Third, consciously recollecting associates on
Think trials would increase hippocampal
activation, confirming its validity as a
marker of mnemonic awareness. Finally,
and importantly, we predicted that during
No-Think trials, because we asked participants to exclude the associate from awareness, unintended awareness of a memory
would trigger inhibitory control to counteract hippocampal signals that contribute to
the recollective state. If so, tracking hippocampal activation during these experiences may allow us to witness the neural
basis of people’s control over awareness in
action.

Materials and Methods
Participants
Eighteen people (10 female, age range: 18 –33)
participated. All participants had spoken English as a primary language since early childhood and had no history of attention deficit
disorder or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Two additional participants participated but were excluded from the study, one
due to scanner error and one for failure to follow the experimental instructions. An additional 96 participants were enrolled in a
behavioral pilot study.

Materials
Stimuli consisted of 57 word pairs, adapted
from Anderson et al. (2004). Thirty-six experimental words pairs were divided into three
sets, which rotated across participants through
the conditions (Think, No-Think, and Baseline). The remaining pairs were fillers, which
were used as buffers at the beginning and end
of lists to avoid primacy and recency effects,
and for practice trials.

Procedure
The procedure had three phases: study, TNT,
and test. All phases were performed inside the
scanner, but fMRI data were only acquired
Figure 1. Behavioral paradigm and results. A, The modified TNT phase required participants to classify whether and how often
during the TNT phase.
Study phase. Participants studied cue- memories entered awareness after each trial. For No-Think trials, we defined any trial when the associate entered consciousness
associate word pairs for 5 s each and then prac- (either “briefly” or “often”) as an intrusion trial, and any trial when the associate did not enter awareness (i.e., “never”) as a
ticed retrieving the responses. On each trial, the nonintrusion trial. B, Recall rates for Baseline and No-Think items for participants in the imaging study and two separate groups of
cue appeared and participants had 5 s to recall participants who took part in a behavioral control study. C, The percentage of Think and No-Think trials during which the associate
the associate and say it out loud. After every entered awareness. D, The frequency of reported intrusion experiences over the 12 repetitions of each No-Think cue in the TNT
trial, the correct associate word appeared as phase. E, The rate at which intrusions declined across the 12 repetitions (i.e., the intrusion slope) predicted how much worse later
feedback for 2 s. An experimenter used the key- No-Think item recall was, compared with Baseline recall (i.e., suppression score). Specifically, participants who showed a steeper
board to indicate if each response was correct. decline in intrusion experiences (plotted as a positive value) showed more below-baseline forgetting on the final test (also plotted
If the correct associate was not provided, that as a positive value). Error bars represent SEM. Suppression and intrusion scores are z-normalized.
cue was re-presented after the other pairs had
appropriate button on an fMRI-compatible box with their right hand.
been tested until each associate was recalled correctly once. Participants
Participants were urged to make these reports honestly and accurately,
were then tested once more on each pair, without feedback, to confirm
and it was emphasized that inaccurate classifications would be harmful to
pairs had been learned. Performance on this test was high (96%). To
the experiment. Participants were further asked to make their classificaensure that unlearned pairs did not contaminate the behavioral or imagtions quickly and intuitively. Participants performed two practice blocks
ing results, all subsequent analyses were conditionalized on correct recall
(25 trials each): first, without making awareness reports, and then with
on this test.
the reports. Both practice blocks were interrupted midway through by
TNT. On each trial, participants received the cue from a pair (e.g.,
the experimenter, who administered a structured interview, which inNeedle) and were asked either to recall and think about the associate (e.g.,
cluded corrective feedback, to ensure that participants performed the
Doctor; Think condition) or to prevent the associate from entering contask as requested. The actual TNT phase consisted of six blocks of 54 trials
sciousness (No-Think condition). Each cue word appeared for 3 s. After
(324 trials total), with each lasting ⬃6 min. Each block included two
every trial, participants received up to 1.5 s to report their experience of
repetitions of each experimental word pair (12 Think cues and 12 Nowhether the associate entered awareness during that trial by pressing the
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Think cues). The remaining six trials were filler word pairs. The presentationorderwascreatedusingaprogram(http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.
edu/optseq) that pseudorandomly mixed the trials and added variable
delays between trials (between 0.5 and 12 s).
Test phase. After completion of the TNT phase, memory for all studied
word pairs was tested to determine how attempts to control awareness
influenced later retention. This phase began with a short practice test and
was followed by two types of final test (same probe and independent
probe), with the order of these tests counterbalanced across participants.
The retrieval cue (either the same cue in the same probe test or a category
and letter stem in the independent probe test) was displayed for up to 4 s.

Behavioral measures
The final test data were analyzed using a mixed-design ANOVA with the
type of final test (same probe or independent probe) and type of item
(Think, Baseline, or No-Think) manipulated within subjects and the
counterbalancing of items through each condition (three levels) and the
order of presentation for the two final tests (two levels) manipulated
between subjects. The behavioral pilot study included an additional
between-subjects manipulation ( presence or absence of intrusion ratings). Of critical importance to our hypotheses were planned comparisons that contrast recall of No-Think items and Baseline items, which
allow us to assess whether below-baseline forgetting was observed.
The other primary dependent measure was how frequently subjects
reported thinking about No-Think response words either “briefly” or
“often” for each of the 12 repetitions of the cue word. A mixed-design
ANOVA was performed on the intrusion frequency data with repetition
included as a within-subject manipulation (12 levels) and word counterbalancing (3 levels) included as a between-subject manipulation.
To assess individual differences, we calculated two behavioral measures for each participant. The suppression score was calculated by subtracting recall of No-Think items from Baseline items and then averaging
this measure across both of the final tests to provide a measure of how
much worse participants’ memories were for associates they had avoided
thinking about than for similarly old items that had not been avoided.
Note that this subtraction treats forgetting as a positive value, so subjects
who showed more forgetting of the avoided memories had higher suppression scores. The intrusion slope score was calculated by taking the
slope of the intrusion frequencies across the six blocks in the TNT phase.
This measure was proportionalized on initial intrusion frequency to account for the fact that initial intrusion rates varied and participants with
more initial intrusions had more room to decrease their intrusion frequency. Moreover, we multiplied each slope by ⫺1 to render the (primarily negative) slope scores as positive values, with increasingly positive
slope scores reflecting increasing levels of control at downregulating the
frequency of intrusions. Both measures were z-normalized within that
participant’s counterbalancing group. Z-normalizing within each item
counterbalancing group controls for differences in the memorability and
intrusiveness of items in each counterbalancing set by quantifying how
unusual a participant’s inhibition or intrusion slope score is with respect
to a homogenous group of participants receiving precisely the same items
in the same conditions. Accounting for such item variability is essential
to better isolate individual differences in the processes of interest.

MRI data acquisition
Whole brain imaging was conducted on a 3 T Siemens Allegra scanner at
the Lewis Center for Neuroimaging at the University of Oregon. To
permit localization of functional activations, each scanning session began with an anatomical scan using a T1-weighted 3D MPRAGE sequence
(voxel size ⫽ 1 ⫻ 1 ⫻ 1 mm, TR ⫽ 2.5 s, TE ⫽ 4.38 ms, flip angle ⫽ 8°).
Blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) functional images were acquired with a T2*-weighted gradient-echo echo-planar sequence (34
contiguous axial slices of 4 mm thickness, 3.125 ⫻ 3.125 mm in-plane
resolution, 64 ⫻ 64 matrix, FOV ⫽ 200 ⫻ 200 ⫻ 256 mm, TR ⫽ 2 s, TE ⫽
25 ms, flip angle ⫽ 80°).

fMRI data processing and analysis
Raw image data were reconstructed using 2D fast Fourier transform with
a distortion correction to reduce artifacts due to magnetic field inhomogeneities and converted to NIFTI format using MRIconvert (http://lcni.
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uoregon.edu/⬃jolinda/MRIConvert/). Preprocessing and statistical
analysis of the data were then conducted using FSL (version 3.3, http://
www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/). Each fMRI run for a given participant was
modeled separately at the first level. Before statistical estimation, the
following standard preprocessing steps were undertaken: motion correction using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002), nonbrain removal using
BET (Smith, 2002), spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of fullwidth at half-maximum 4 mm, mean-based intensity normalization of
all volumes by the same factor, and highpass temporal filtering (100 s).
Estimates of the degrees of freedom in the statistical model were corrected for autocorrelation in the data by using the FSL prewhitening
technique (Woolrich et al., 2001). Time-series statistical analysis was
performed using FILM with local autocorrelation correction (Woolrich
et al., 2001). Each event was modeled as an impulse convolved with a
canonical hemodynamic response function (a double-gamma basis
function).
Each participant’s six runs were then analyzed using a fixed-effects
model and the group analysis used a random-effects model with FLAME
(Beckmann et al., 2003). Higher level statistical maps were thresholded
by using clusters determined by Z ⬎ 2.3 and a (corrected) cluster threshold of p ⫽ 0.05, according to the Gaussian random fields (Worsley et al.,
1992). Registration to high resolution and standard images (MNI152template) was implemented using FLIRT (Jenkinson and Smith, 2001).

Region of interest analyses
Our primary hypotheses concerned activation within the hippocampus,
so this region was manually defined on the anatomical scans based on
established anatomical landmarks (Insausti et al., 1998; Pruessner et al.,
2000, 2002; Zeineh et al., 2000, 2003). In addition, we also manually
defined three other medial temporal lobe (MTL) regions ( parahippocampal, entorhinal, and perirhinal cortices). Time-course data were
then extracted from these regions of interest (ROIs) using PEATE (www.
jonaskaplan.com/peate). We calculated a measure of activity in each ROI
for each trial type by averaging across the time points from 4 to 8 s
poststimulus onset and then subtracting out the onset value to account for pretrial variability. These values were then entered into a
region by hemisphere by condition ANOVA to test for significance
across participants. Given our a priori interest in hippocampal activation, however, we begin by reporting planned comparisons within
bilateral hippocampus (we had no a priori theories about hemispheric
asymmetries) and then proceed to discuss the pattern in other MTL
regions. These same values were also used to study the correlation
with behavioral measures of forgetting.

Results
Behavioral results
Memory performance on the final test
Consistent with prior findings (Anderson and Green, 2001;
Anderson and Huddleston, 2012), suppressing retrieval of
No-Think items harmed people’s later memory for those
items on the final test, relative to Baseline pairs that were also
studied but that did not appear during the TNT phase (Fig.
1 B). In particular, all three groups showed significantly more
forgetting of No-Think items than Baseline items (fMRI subjects: F(1,12) ⫽ 16.5, p ⬍ 0.005; control subjects with intrusion
ratings: F(1,84) ⫽ 8.6, p ⬍ 0.005; control subjects without intrusion ratings: F(1,84) ⫽ 9.6, p ⬍ 0.005) and this did not
interact with test type (fMRI subjects: F(1,12) ⫽ 2.4, p ⫽ 0.15;
control subjects with intrusion ratings: F(1,84) ⫽ 1.4, p ⫽ 0.24;
control subjects without intrusion ratings: F(1,84) ⫽ 1.1, p ⫽
0.31). Furthermore, in the control study this forgetting effect did
not interact with whether or not participants had to classify intrusion experiences after each trial (F(1,84) ⫽ 0.1), indicating that
the forgetting effect was unmodified by including trial-by-trial
phenomenal reports. Thus, suppression impaired people’s ability
to recollect memories formed at study, exceeding what would be
expected based on the passage of time, and forgetting did not
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Table 1. Overall frequencies of phenomenal reports of awareness for Think and
No-Think trials, separated by response typea
Condition
fMRI participants (n ⫽ 18)
Think
No-Think
Control participants with ratings (n ⫽ 48)
Think
No-Think

Never

Briefly

Often

2.9%
62.6%

5.6%
34.9%

91.5%
2.6%

7.6%
64.5%

9.9%
31.3%

82.4%
4.2%

a

Given the infrequency of “often” responses in the No-Think condition and of “briefly” responses in the Think
condition, we collapsed across the briefly and often conditions to create a binary measure of awareness.

interact with whether participants reported subjective ratings of
their mnemonic experience. These findings confirm that efforts
to control conscious awareness during retrieval suppression impair the later ability to voluntarily recreate consciousness of
memories on a delayed test (Anderson and Green, 2001).
In contrast to the No-Think items, engaging in retrieval did
not, in general, affect retention of Think items (M ⫽ 86%) compared to performance in the Baseline condition (M ⫽ 87%),
either in our whole sample of 114 participants (F(1,96) ⫽ 1.8, p ⫽
0.18) or when the analysis was restricted to participants who
performed subjective ratings (F(1,96) ⫽ 1.5, p ⫽ 0.22), nor was
there an interaction between subjects who reported ratings and
those who did not (F(1,96) ⬍ 1). As might be expected, No-Think
items were also impaired relative to Think items, across all 114
participants (F(1,96) ⫽ 13.4, p ⬍ 0.001) as well as within the more
restricted sample that reported subjective ratings, (F(1,96) ⫽ 7.5,
p ⬍ 0.01), Again, this did not interact with whether or not subjects reported subjective ratings (F(1,96) ⬍ 1). It is perhaps surprising that retrieval did not facilitate performance, though
facilitation effects are quite small in this paradigm in general,
particularly when performance is near to ceiling, and no feedback
is given during the TNT phase (Levy and Anderson, 2008).
Reports of conscious awareness during retrieval suppression
During the TNT phase, participants reported that associates were
successfully brought into awareness on nearly all of the Think
trials (M ⫽ 97.1%, Fig. 1C and Table 1). On No-Think trials,
however, participants reported that associates entered awareness
far less frequently (M ⫽ 37.5%), showing that participants were
largely successful at regulating awareness according to task goals
(t(17) ⫽ 11.98, p ⬍ 0.001). Nevertheless, No-Think associates
frequently intruded into conscious awareness. Of the intrusions
that occurred, 93% were classified as “brief” (Table 1), reflecting
either the truncation of mnemonic awareness by control or a
failure to sustain attention toward that memory. Importantly, we
predicted that memories would frequently intrude into awareness involuntarily initially, but that with repeated attempts to
stop retrieval, intrusion frequency would decline. Indeed, intrusions declined appreciably from the first suppression attempt to
the twelfth (fMRI subjects: F(1,15) ⫽ 18.5, p ⬍ 0.001; control
subjects: F(1,45) ⫽ 48.6, p ⬍ 0.001) indicating that participants
gained increasing control over the entrance of memories into
conscious awareness (Fig. 1 D). This improved regulation of
awareness may reflect a mixture of increasing success at preempting retrieval and accumulating inhibition of suppressed traces
that renders them less intrusive over trials.
Relationship between the control of awareness and later forgetting
If successfully excluding a memory from conscious awareness
and later forgetting represent outcomes of a common inhibitory control process, one should find that variations in regulating awareness predict the amount of forgetting. Specifically,

we predicted that the rate at which intrusions declined over
repetitions would predict later memory suppression, reflecting a relationship between the control mechanisms that exclude a memory from consciousness and later forgetting.
Consistent with this hypothesis, the participants who improved the most at reducing intrusions over repetitions also
experienced the most suppression-induced forgetting on the final
test (r ⫽ 0.45, p ⬍ 0.05; Fig. 1 E). There was also a correlation
between the overall frequency of intrusions and forgetting (r ⫽
0.62, p ⬍ 0.01), again suggesting that the subjects who were best
able to overcome intrusions were the ones who were most likely
to forget. This hypothesized control process, triggered to suppress momentary conscious awareness of an involuntary recollection, may achieve this regulatory outcome in part by
disrupting the hippocampal representation that contributes to
mnemonic awareness, and that also supports the ability to recreate awareness voluntarily on later tests. Importantly, these
findings indicate that moments of unwanted awareness indeed
arise in this procedure, that people actively suppress that awareness as we requested, and that we can isolate those moments on a
trial-by-trial basis to track neural activity relating to the purging
of contents from consciousness.
fMRI results
Brain regions engaged by the attempt to regulate consciousness
Attempting to stop retrieval in the No-Think condition has previously been found to engage a frontoparietal network and to
reduce activation in the hippocampus (Anderson et al., 2004;
Depue et al., 2007). Consistent with these observations, activity
during No-Think trials, relative to Think trials, revealed widespread prefrontal engagement of both lateral prefrontal (including dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and lateral
premotor cortex) and medial prefrontal regions (including anterior cingulate cortex, supplementary motor area, and presupplementary motor area), along with bilateral intraparietal sulcus
(Fig. 2A; Tables 2, 3). Importantly, this evidence for the engagement of cognitive control during No-Think trials was accompanied by reduced activation in the bilateral hippocampus and
parahippocampal cortex, relative to Think trials. Thus, the expected neural systems engaged by retrieval suppression were
found, despite the inclusion of trial-by-trial queries of people’s
conscious experience during Think and No-Think trials.
The modulation of hippocampal activation observed here
tracks the robust differences in phenomenological reports of conscious recollection between the Think and No-Think conditions
(Fig. 1C), and it is consistent with our assumption that recollection is linked to hippocampal activity. To further explore this
modulation, both hippocampi were anatomically defined in each
individual participant based on structural landmarks (Insausti et
al., 1998; Pruessner et al., 2000, 2002; Zeineh et al., 2000, 2003).
Activity within this anatomical ROI was clearly modulated by the
task, as activity was greater during Think trials than during NoThink trials (F(1,17) ⫽ 10.1, p ⬍ 0.01; Fig. 2 B). Importantly, this
modulation reflected both increased activation during Think trials (F(1,17) ⫽ 6.9, p ⬍ 0.05) and decreased activation during NoThink trials (F(1,17) ⫽ 4.5, p ⬍ 0.05), relative to pretrial baseline
activity. Thus, hippocampal activation arising in response to a
retrieval cue varied according to participants’ recollection goals.
Increased hippocampal activation during Think trials confirms
the validity as a marker of mnemonic awareness, consistent with
prior electrophysiological and hemodynamic findings (Eldridge
et al., 2000; Kreiman et al., 2000; Eichenbaum et al., 2007;
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Figure 2. Imaging results and the relationship between hippocampal activation and below-baseline forgetting. A, Comparison of brain activity during Think and No-Think trials. Warm colors indicate more
activation when participants tried to keep the associate out of mind than when they tried to bring the associate to mind, whereas cool colors indicate regions that were less active during attempts to suppress
conscious awareness (black arrows highlight reduced activity in the hippocampus). B, Activation in a priori structurally defined hippocampal ROIs for Think trials and No-Think trials. C, Activation in a priori
structurally defined hippocampal ROIs for Think trials and both types of No-Think trials: intrusions where the to-be-avoided memory entered awareness and nonintrusions where memory retrieval was
successfullystopped.D,Themagnitudeofsignalreductioninthehippocampusduringintrusions(theaveragepercentagesignalchangebetween4and8safterstimulusonset,displayedasapositivevalue)was
correlated, across participants, with below-baseline forgetting of No-Think items on the final test. E, This same measure of hippocampal activity during nonintrusions trials was not related to the amount of
forgetting later observed. Error bars for all panels represent SEM.

Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2008; Montaldi and Mayes, 2010). The reduction in hippocampal activation during No-Think trials supports a role of inhibitory control in limiting hippocampal
contributions to conscious awareness. Crucially, however, these
findings leave unanswered whether hippocampal activity was

modulated proactively in response to TNT cues to preempt retrieval, or instead was suppressed reactively to purge memories
that momentarily intruded into awareness. Addressing this question requires examining hippocampal activation in relation to
reports of mnemonic awareness.

Levy and Anderson • Purging Memories from Consciousness

16790 • J. Neurosci., November 21, 2012 • 32(47):16785–16794

Table 2. Regions more active during No-Think trials than during Think trialsa
Cluster extent,
voxels

Brain region

⬃BA

Max Z

x

Right inferior frontal gyrus
Left orbitofrontal cortex
Pre-SMA
Pre-SMA
Pre-SMA
Pre-SMA/dorsal ACCb

44
11
8/9
8
6/8
6/32

5.85
5.70
5.54
5.52
5.48
5.42

52
⫺34
⫺2
⫺6
4
6

12
20
32
16
12
22

⫺2
⫺10
46
52
66
40

32514

4.54
4.38
4.26
4.07
3.91
3.79

⫺34
⫺30
⫺30
⫺30
⫺32
⫺48

⫺60
⫺88
⫺84
⫺84
⫺68
⫺60

⫺36
14
⫺16
⫺10
⫺36
⫺42

4792

Left cerebellum
Left lateral occipital cortex
Left lateral occipital cortex
Left occipital fusiform gyrus
Left cerebellum
Left cerebellum

18/19
18/19
37/19

y

z

Left intraparietal sulcus
Left intraparietal sulcus
Left intraparietal sulcus
Left intraparietal sulcus
Left intraparietal sulcus
Left intraparietal sulcusc

7
7
7
7
7
7

4.85
4.32
4.19
4.09
3.90
3.88

⫺18
⫺18
⫺22
⫺38
⫺20
⫺16

⫺72
⫺68
⫺64
⫺58
⫺64
⫺64

54
42
60
50
48
56

2382

Right intraparietal sulcus
Right intraparietal sulcus
Right intraparietal sulcus
Right intraparietal sulcus
Right supramarginal gyrus
Right intraparietal sulcusd

7
7
7
7
40
7

4.51
4.23
4.15
4.05
3.99
3.93

26
14
24
18
54
36

⫺66
⫺64
⫺62
⫺70
⫺46
⫺64

58
42
48
58
30
58

2300

a

ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; BA, Brodmann’s area; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; SMA, supplementary
motor area.
b
This cluster encompassed several other regions including bilateral portions of DLPFC, basal ganglia, insula, and
lateral frontopolar cortex, as well as left inferior frontal gyrus.
c
This cluster also extended down into inferior lateral parietal cortex in the supramarginal gyrus.
d
This cluster also extended down into inferior lateral parietal cortex in the supramarginal gyrus.

Table 3. Regions more active during Think trials than during No-Think trialsa
Cluster extent,
voxels

Brain region

⬃BA

Max Z

Occipital lobe
Occipital lobe
Dorsal posterior cingulate
Retrosplenial cortex
Retrosplenial cortex
Retrosplenial cortexb

17
17
31
29
29
29

5.16
4.76
4.58
4.49
4.38
4.36

20
22
⫺6
10
14
8

⫺96
⫺94
⫺34
⫺62
⫺62
⫺54

20
16
48
8
18
2

11785

Left insula/Heschl’s gyrus
Left central operculum
Left central operculum
Left Heschl’s gyrus
Left insula
Left planum polarec

13/41/42

4.6
4.38
4.36
4.31
4.31
4.01

⫺38
⫺46
⫺60
⫺42
⫺36
⫺50

⫺20
⫺18
⫺8
⫺22
⫺16
⫺6

2
18
6
12
16
2

2892

Ventral ACC/medial PFC
Subcallosal cortex
Subcallosal cortex
Frontopolar cortex
Subcallosal, Medial PFC
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ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; BA, Brodmann’s area; PFC, prefrontal cortex.
This cluster also extended forward into the right hippocampus 关peak: 32, ⫺26, 14兴 and parahippocampal cortex
关peak: 32, ⫺34, ⫺16兴.)
c
This cluster extended medially into the left anterior hippocampus 关peak: ⫺4, ⫺10, ⫺18兴.)
b

Reports of conscious awareness and hippocampal modulation
Because participants’ goal on No-Think trials is to stop a retrieval
cue from eliciting awareness of an associated memory, any intrusion of that memory into awareness is counter-intentional, and,
we hypothesize that such a violation of task goals would be more

likely to trigger inhibitory control to terminate awareness. As
such, our most important prediction was that during No-Think
trials, unintended awareness of a memory would trigger inhibitory control to counteract hippocampal signals that contribute to
the recollective state. To observe this proposed purging of memories from awareness, we isolated trials on which participants
perceived intruding memories in consciousness, contrary to task
goals, and tracked a neural marker of the regulatory impact of
control. Given prior observations of downregulated activity in
the hippocampus during retrieval suppression (Anderson et al.,
2004; Depue et al., 2007) we thought this was a good candidate
mechanism for controlling awareness. This possibility is consistent with analogous downregulations observed in neocortical areas representing distracting perceptual information during
working memory tasks, which also have been interpreted as
markers for inhibitory control (Gazzaley et al., 2005). If this hypothesis is correct, and if inhibitory control is triggered by neural
signals of awareness, then we should find more downregulation
of hippocampal activation during No-Think trials accompanied
by momentary awareness of an intruding memory than during
No-Think trials not accompanied by awareness.
Hippocampal activation for intrusions and nonintrusions
strongly confirmed this hypothesis. During intrusions, the hippocampus exhibited robust reductions in activation relative to
baseline (F(1,17) ⫽ 17.3, p ⬍ 0.001; Fig. 2C). In the absence of an
intrusion experience, however, the reduction in hippocampal activation did not reliably differ from either baseline (F ⬍ 1) or
Think trials (F(1,17) ⫽ 1.5, p ⬎ 0.2). Importantly, there was significantly less hippocampal activation during intrusions than
during nonintrusions (F(1,17) ⫽ 9.9, p ⬍ 0.01; Fig. 2C). These
findings isolate the negative BOLD response observed during retrieval suppression to trials that require participants to purge
conscious awareness of intruding memories.
Notably, reduced hippocampal activation during intrusions is
the inverse of what one expects based on the presumed relationship
between hippocampal activation and the degree of recollection.
Given that intentional recollection (Think trials) increased hippocampal activation as expected, we suggest that this inversion arises
from a brief recollective signal that is then countered by a robust
inhibitory control response. This recollective signal during intrusions may be difficult to measure given its brevity, variable timing,
and limits on the temporal resolution of fMRI. If hippocampal
downregulation is triggered as a response to momentary intrusions,
these findings associate people’s goal-directed efforts to purge a
memory from conscious awareness with measurable neural impacts
of control on hippocampal activity.
Hippocampal modulation during conscious intrusions predicts
later forgetting
It was necessary to confirm, however, that the reduced activation
evident during intrusions truly reflects the hypothesized control
mechanism thought to underlie the purging of momentary conscious awareness. To establish this we needed to show that the
reduced hippocampal response during intrusions was not merely
the absence of hippocampal activation, but rather a functionally
important downregulation. Toward that end, we examined
whether reductions in hippocampal activation predicted behavioral memory impairment on the final test, which previously had
been established to involve inhibitory control (Anderson and
Green, 2001; Anderson et al., 2004; Depue et al., 2007; Anderson
and Huddleston, 2012). The hypothesized downregulation of
hippocampal activity may be especially disruptive when it occurs
during an intrusion, in which the neural representation of an
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episodic trace has been briefly reactivated (Nader et al., 2000;
Dudai, 2004). Inhibitory control may achieve such disruption
(Anderson and Spellman, 1995; Anderson, 2003) and if so, the
amount of signal reduction during conscious intrusions should
predict memory impairment.
Strikingly, the extent to which hippocampal activation was
reduced during intrusions predicted later memory suppression
robustly (r ⫽ 0.70, p ⬍ 0.005; Fig. 2 D). That is, participants who
showed the greatest reduction in hippocampal activity during
intrusions were the ones who showed the largest below-baseline
memory suppression effects for No-Think items. That hippocampal downregulation predicted memory performance that
was worse than baseline implies the existence of a mechanism
that disrupts retention. In contrast, when intrusions did not occur, variations in the amount of hippocampal activity bore no
reliable relationship to forgetting (Fig. 2 E).
These findings strongly support the hypothesis that intrusions
trigger active downregulation that disrupted later recall of reactivated traces, consistent with reactivation-induced lability (Nader et al., 2000; Dudai, 2004). Nonintrusion trials did not reliably
trigger this downregulation response, possibly because items on
those trials did not require control or because awareness was
successfully preempted by other control processes that did not
involve the modulation of hippocampal activity. Collectively,
these findings support the view that reduced hippocampal activation during intrusions reflects active downregulation that
purges mnemonic contents from awareness. Prior research suggests that a likely candidate for the source of this downregulation
is the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), as engagement of
this region during No-Think trials predicts below-baseline forgetting (Anderson et al., 2004; Depue et al., 2007). Consistent
with those findings, we observed two clusters that predicted individual differences in below-baseline forgetting (at a relaxed
threshold, p ⬍ 0.005, 20 voxel minimum), both of which fell
within DLPFC (peak voxels: x ⫽ ⫺18, y ⫽ 44, z ⫽ 44; x ⫽ 30, y ⫽
28, z ⫽ 48). Intriguingly, activity in the left DLPFC cluster during
intrusions negatively correlated with right hippocampal activation during intrusions (r ⫽ ⫺0.48, p ⬍ 0.05), but only during a
later time window (6 –10 s) than the one used in earlier analyses.
This apparent negative coupling between DLPFC and hippocampus suggests that the DLPFC may provide the source of top-down
control. No reliable correlations with forgetting or hippocampal
activity were observed in this region during nonintrusions. These
speculations fit well with evidence, recently discovered with dynamic causal modeling, demonstrating that DLPFC is negatively
coupled with hippocampus during retrieval suppression, particularly for good inhibitors (Benoit and Anderson, 2012).
Patterns similar to those observed in the hippocampus were also
observed in other MTL regions.
Our primary theoretical hypotheses concerned activity within the
hippocampus, but it is possible that other regions within the MTL
are similarly modulated by this task. In addition to anatomically
defining the hippocampus, we also created anatomically defined
ROIs for the perirhinal, entorhinal, and parahippocampal cortices. We then repeated our analyses for the hippocampus in these
other regions to investigate whether similar patterns are observed
in these other MTL regions as well. First, we investigated whether
a similar ordering of the Think, nonintrusion, and intrusion was
observed in these regions (Fig. 3). An ANOVA including all four
MTL ROIs revealed a significant main effect of condition
(F(2,34) ⫽ 5.9, p ⬍ 0.01) and a marginal interaction with hemisphere (F(6,102) ⫽ 3.1, p ⫽ 0.06), but condition did not interact
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with region (F ⬍ 1) and the three-way interaction with region
and hemisphere was also not significant (F(6,102) ⫽ 1.6, p ⫽ 0.16).
This suggests that although we have focused on downregulation
of hippocampal activation, the control response appears to extend beyond the hippocampus. The marginal interaction with
hemisphere reflects the fact that modulation tended to be more
robust in the right hemisphere than the left hemisphere, particularly for the cortical regions (hemisphere did not interact with
any of the effects reported earlier within the hippocampus, Fs ⬍
1.5). We also assessed whether the magnitude of downregulation
in these regions during intrusions (but not during nonintrusions) predicted participant’s suppression scores. We again observed similar patterns in several of these other MTL regions (Fig.
3). While these cortical regions were only investigated in a post
hoc fashion, it is interesting to note that the control response
appears to extend beyond the hippocampus proper into surrounding cortical structures.

Discussion
A central feature of consciousness is the ability to voluntarily
direct and control its contents. The present results provide
unique evidence that the capacity to purge the contents of awareness is achieved by suppressing neural activity underpinning the
aware state—in this case, activation in the hippocampus. Critically, this modulation of hippocampal activation during the
purging of awareness predicted later retention of the purged
trace. These data provide a striking link between the intentional
regulation of phenomenal awareness and the neural events that
implement this control.
The linkage between the intentional regulation of awareness
and the neural manifestations of control observed here is unusually specific. Simply separating No-Think trials according to participants’ first-person experience of whether they briefly
perceived a memory in conscious awareness revealed starkly different levels of activation in the hippocampus, allowing us to
witness the regulatory response on neural processes contributing
to mnemonic awareness. One interpretation of this specificity is
that inhibitory control was triggered by the emergence of unwanted memorial contents in consciousness. Upregulation of inhibitory control in reaction to consciously detected conflict is
predicted, for instance, by the global neuronal workspace model
of consciousness (Dehaene et al., 1998; Sergent and Dehaene,
2004), which posits a sharp nonlinear transition between unconscious and conscious processing, and, importantly, a dependence
of executive control on detection of conscious conflict (Dehaene
et al., 2003; Mayr, 2004). A second interpretation is that awareness is sufficient, but not necessary to trigger inhibitory control.
Inhibitory control may be upregulated in response to unwanted
activation regardless of whether a memory is conscious, and reactivation in the hippocampus may simply correlate highly with
awareness. Indeed, even nonintrusion trials showed a modest,
though not reliable reduction in activity during retrieval suppression, suggesting that awareness may simply increase the level of
control. Whichever interpretation is correct, these findings support the view that when unwanted traces are perceived in awareness, inhibitory control can be deployed to suppress activity that
contributes to awareness to end this phenomenological state, establishing a link between inhibitory control and the purging of
content from consciousness.
Though our data indicate that inhibition is upregulated to
purge memories from awareness, inhibition may not be limited
to this reactive role. Inhibition may be engaged proactively, for
example, to prevent intrusions. Indeed, the sizeable reduction in
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Figure 3. Activation in anatomically defined MTL ROIs and the relationship between this activation and suppression scores. While the primary hypotheses concerned the hippocampus, for
completeness we report the data from all four MTL ROIs in the right (A) and left (B) hemisphere. Each quadrant represents an ROI (illustrated in the coronal slices in the center of the figure) and within
those quadrants are four panels: activity during Think and No-Think trials, without distinguishing between intrusions and nonintrusions (upper left); activity during Think, nonintrusion, and
intrusion trials (upper right); the relationship between behavioral suppression scores and downregulation of this region during nonintrusion trials (lower left); and the relationship between
suppression scores and downregulation of this region during intrusion trials (lower right). The value of distinguishing awareness of No-Think items is reflected in the increased control response to
intrusions throughout the panels, and in its robust prediction of forgetting. All error bars reflect SEM.

Levy and Anderson • Purging Memories from Consciousness

awareness of the memory on the very first retrieval suppression
trial (M ⫽ 60%) compared to the first Think trial (M ⫽ 97%)
suggests that participants are very good at proactively controlling
awareness. This proactive control may be achieved by downregulating neocortical activity in areas not addressed in the current
study. Intrusions, by this view, may simply trigger one specific
form of inhibitory control that involves modulating activity
within the hippocampus, and may not represent the only form of
control involved in stopping retrieval. These conjectures fit with
the fact that, while hippocampal reductions during intrusions
predict a sizable portion of the variance (nearly 50%) in belowbaseline forgetting, they do not explain all forgetting, suggesting
the mechanisms involved in preempting intrusions may also impair memory without hippocampal modulation. Moreover, inhibition is unlikely to be the only means of controlling awareness.
Control over awareness may also be sustained over time, for example, by additional mechanisms engaged in parallel with or
after inhibition, that redirect attention to alternative foci, such as
to the reminder or to substitute thoughts (Benoit and Anderson,
2012). At a minimum, however, the present findings show that
hippocampal activation relating to the aware state can be suppressed to disrupt awareness, and that this suppression impairs
retention of the suppressed trace.
Perhaps the most compelling aspect of the hippocampal responses observed here is that variations in the degree of downregulation during intrusions predicted future forgetting of the
purged trace. The greater the reduction in hippocampal activation during an intrusion, the worse later memory performance
was for No-Think items, compared with performance on Baseline items. This variation in hippocampal downregulation underscores how reduced hippocampal activation is not an obligatory
sequela of an intrusion; rather, it reflects the outcome of a control
response, varying widely across individuals, which holds the potential to make memory for suppressed items worse than it would
ordinarily be. Critically, this relationship of hippocampal modulation with later retention was absent for nonintrusions, linking
suppression-induced forgetting specifically to the purging of a
reactivated trace from awareness. These observations suggest that
reductions in hippocampal activity during No-Think trials reflect
active control and not a mere failure to engage the hippocampus.
If reduced hippocampal activity during intrusions simply reflected a failure to engage hippocampally mediated recollection,
there would be no reason to expect a worsening of memory compared with baseline; rather, memories would merely be deprived
of further benefit that would have arisen from their reactivation.
Second, a failure to engage the hippocampus during retrieval
suppression also has difficulty explaining why hippocampal activation during intrusions was not more similar to that observed
during Think trials, owing to increased engagement of recollection on those suppression trials. That intrusions were associated
with further reductions in activation compared with nonintrusions suggests an active response counteracting recollection.
Thus intrusion-specific reductions in activation are uniquely
predictive of forgetting, consistent with active downregulation in
service of purging the contents of mnemonic awareness.
The strong and specific relationship between our measure of
memory inhibition and hippocampal downregulation during intrusions echoes work showing that reactivating a memory makes
it especially vulnerable (Nader et al., 2000; Dudai, 2004). In the
present design, awareness of an intruding memory indicates that
the memory has been at least briefly reactivated during the trial.
Such reactivation may render traces vulnerable to disruption,
consistent with research on reconsolidation (Nader et al., 2000;
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Dudai, 2004). Disruption might, in the present design, occur via
the suppression of activity supporting awareness, a possibility
consistent with other forms of reactivation-dependent inhibition
(Anderson and Spellman, 1995; Anderson, 2003; Kuhl et al.,
2007). If so, the amount of signal reduction should predict forgetting, and this relationship should arise only when reactivation
occurs, as we observed. These findings are thus consistent with
reactivation-induced lability (Nader et al., 2000; Dudai, 2004).
Although consistent, the exact relationship to reconsolidation is
unclear, as our design does not permit us to address those processes, which unfold more slowly over time.
The downregulation of hippocampal activation observed here
may be analogous to downregulations of neocortical areas observed when people ignore distracting input in a visual working
memory task. For instance, activation in the parahippocampal
place area is reduced when places must be ignored during the
encoding of faces into visual working memory (Gazzaley et al.,
2005). This finding may be an instance of the principle advocated
here, that purging unwanted content is achieved by suppressing
neural activation supporting awareness of the purged content.
What cannot be discerned in that prior work, however, is
whether downregulation reflects preemptive modulation of
areas representing the distracting content to prevent encoding
of that information, or instead the purging of unwanted contents that have already penetrated awareness. No measures
were included to differentiate trials in which distracting information entered awareness from those when it did not. Because of
our use of the trial-by-trial method of introspection, the present
findings are unique in tying the voluntary purging of contents
that penetrated phenomenal awareness to the downregulation of
neural activity supporting awareness, and, moreover, in demonstrating that such downregulation has persisting behavioral consequences consistent with inhibition.
Although the present findings point to neural activation
markers that reflect the purging of mnemonic awareness, BOLD
activation indirectly measures neural activity. If our mechanistic
hypothesis is correct, however, one should observe in the behavior of individual neurons linked to awareness reduced firing that
accompanies the intention to purge unwanted contents. Previous
work has shown that ignoring an object in a visual-selective attention task is linked to downregulated activity in hippocampal
neurons that preferentially respond to that object, providing an
important precedent for the present hypothesis (Cerf et al.,
2010). Unlike the highly targeted control response in that work,
however, the present downregulation appears to be more widespread, and to have persisting consequences. Nevertheless, if
these phenomena are related, purging memories from awareness
may disrupt the stability of the mapping of hippocampal neurons
to their preferred objects, reflecting the neural basis of memory
disruption similar to that found here. Thus, observing neural
activity relating to the emergence of episodic awareness and its
termination by inhibitory control should be possible. Because
inhibitory control is engaged in a range of cognitive domains
(Anderson and Spellman, 1995; Anderson and Green, 2001; Gazzaley et al., 2005), it may also support the intentional purging of
awareness in contexts other than memory. If so, the current findings provide a mechanistic hypothesis about how human beings
terminate awareness of unwanted mnemonic content that may
extend to the suppression of conscious content throughout the
brain. The nature of phenomenal awareness itself remains unsolved (Chalmers, 1995), but the current linkage of first-person
experience to the regulation of neural activity suggests that the
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physical basis by which people voluntarily stop this experience
may ultimately be witnessed and understood.
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